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Introduction  
This report contains proposals for a new framework for development cooperation. The 
Cold War is over and we have an opportunity to replace the ideological competition that 
dominated international relations for nearly half a century by a new ethos of solidarity 
and cooperation. The world is no longer divided between East and West and we must not 
let it become divided again along a new fault line separating North from South. Instead of 
viewing international relations in terms of conflicts between states we suggest that the 
problems of the globe should be seen in the round, as problems confronting all of us, and 
as problems we face as people and not as citizens of states. Indeed the actions of states 
frequently are the source of global problems and adequate solutions to those problems 
may require that the actions of states be constrained by rules delineating acceptable 
international behaviour.  
The framework we propose seeks whenever possible to be based on the mutual interests 
of people. States as such have no interests; only people or groups of people have 
interests, and group interests increasingly transcend national boundaries. Thus in thinking 
about a framework for development cooperation, we have tried to keep people sharply in 
focus. We look for positive sum games where all players benefit or, failing that, for 
solutions where everyone potentially could gain if compensation were paid to the losers. 
Of course even if everyone gains there might still be conflicts over the division of gains, 
but at least such conflicts can in principle be resolved without making anyone absolutely 
worse off. This approach leads inevitably to giving high priority to policies which 
accelerate growth or which result in greater efficiency in the use of the world's resources. 
Often this means extending the market mechanism to new areas (the migration of labour, 
exports from poor countries) or devising market-like mechanisms to cope with new 
problems (global environmental issues, the disposal of nuclear weapons). Growth and 
liberalization thus are themes which run throughout the report. We accept that policies 
which promote mutual interests do not necessarily also promote human development or 
reduce global poverty or contribute to other desired objectives. Something more is likely 
to be needed, namely, policies which seek to achieve justice or equity.  
It is for this reason that an equally prominent theme of this report is equity: a need to 
provide a global safety net to combat severe poverty in the poorest countries and a need 
for the rich to compensate the poor when discriminatory actions of the former injure 
those who are weak and vulnerable. These ideas of equity, solidarity, community are a 
commonplace in nation states and we propose to extend them to all people, everywhere. 
Hunger, disease, misery are becoming no more acceptable "abroad" than they are at 
"home" and, indeed, as our horizons widen the distinction between home and abroad 
becomes blurred. It is no longer an oxymoron to speak of a global community. Similarly, 
just as discrimination within a state is not tolerated, and those who discriminate are liable 
for damages, so too discrimination by states against others should not be permissible and 
those who discriminate should be required to pay compensation.  The report is divided into five sections. In section 1 we present a new framework for 
development assistance. We recommend that the existing system be replaced by a new 
institution, a reformed UNDP, that would be responsible for transferring grants from rich 
countries to poor. The transfer would be financed by a progressive income tax on the 
GNP of rich countries and it would be allocated to developing countries in inverse 
proportion to their per capita income. The new system would thus be the foundation for a 
global safety net.  
Section 2 contains an outline of two innovative proposals that are intended to establish a 
coherent framework for extra-market financial transactions between countries. The first 
proposal creates a mechanism to facilitate payments by one country to another for 
services rendered. These services occur outside the market mechanism--they are not part 
of a network of international commerce--and originate out of a process of bilateral or 
multilateral negotiation. They are mutually beneficial activities which by their nature 
cannot be mediated by markets. Examples include payments for environmental services, 
payments for the control of narcotic drugs and payments for the control of contagious 
disease.  
The second proposal creates a mechanism to facilitate compensation for damages when 
one country inflicts economic injury on another. Compensation can be thought of as fines 
payable by countries which depart from internationally agreed rules of good conduct. We 
present three examples to illustrate how the principle might work: brain drain, the 
international migration of low-skilled labour and trade restrictions on exports from poor 
countries. These fines are in a sense voluntary since they can be avoided by refraining 
from engaging in objectionable behaviour.  
In section 3 we turn our attention to increasing technological capabilities in developing 
countries. One issue we address is intellectual property rights and the granting of 
monopoly privileges to those who add to the world's stock of knowledge. We challenge 
patent rights, arguing that they are inefficient, inequitable and unnecessary, and suggest 
that because of the public good nature of knowledge, more research should be publicly 
funded and placed in the public domain where it would be accessible to everyone. A 
second issue we address is strategies by developing countries to increase their 
technological capabilities. Here we argue that developing countries would be well 
advised to give priority to building a broad base of knowledge about science and 
technology among the population and creating a skilled labour force that is well trained in 
scientific subjects. We favour giving a lower priority to the alternative approach of 
creating a small elite of world class scientists and engineers working in expensively 
equipped laboratories.  
Section 4 contains an attempt to construct a global balance sheet of economic relations 
between rich and poor countries. We consider aid flows, direct foreign investment, 
portfolio investment, commercial lending and the migration of labour. Official 
development assistance, despite its many faults, does accrue disproportionately to the 
poorest of the developing countries whether expressed as aid received per capita or as a 
fraction of GDP. Thus aid helps to reduce inequality in the distribution of global income. Within ODA as a whole, however, technical assistance is allocated disproportionately to 
the less poor developing countries. The net resource transfer associated with flows of 
private capital is negative for all groups of developing countries, particularly for the 
relatively more prosperous developing countries. This negative resource transfer is offset 
by workers remittances in the case of developing countries in the middle income range, 
so that overall they benefit marginally from the operation of international capital and 
labour markets. But in the case of countries at the extremities--the very poor and the 
relatively more prosperous countries--the net resource transfer, even after taking 
remittances into account, is negative and hence market forces accentuate global income 
inequalities.  
Finally, in section 5, we present a new institutional framework for development 
cooperation. Our present structures are weak and fragmented; they reflect the priorities of 
a departed era; they are not capable of resolving the problems faced by our global 
community. We recommend the transformation of the IMF into a World Central Bank; 
the merging of the functions of GATT and UNCTAD into an International Trade 
Organization; the conversion of ECOSOC into an Economic Security Council; and the 
restructuring of UNDP into UNDP with three functions, namely, administering the 
scheme for a global safety net, organizing the compensation programme and designing 
and then running the scheme to effect payments for services rendered. Finally, we 
recommend that the World Bank and the multilateral regional development banks be 
closed since their services would no longer be necessary.  
 